State of Utah v. Luis Mirio Ceron : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
State of Utah v. Luis Mirio Ceron : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald S. Fujino; counsel for appellee.
Laura B. Dupaix; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Aaron W. Flater;
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; counsel for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Ceron, No. 20090489 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1726
Case No. 20090489-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Luis Ceron, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Reply Brief 
LAURA B. DUPAIX (5195) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
RONALD FUJINO 
4764 South 900 East, Suite 2 AARON W. FLATER 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee Counsel for Appellant 
Oral Argument Requested FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN 1 8 2011 
Case No. 20090489-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Luis Ceron, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Reply Brief 
LAURA B. DUPAIX (5195) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
AARON W. FLATER 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
Counsel for Appellant 
RONALD FUJINO 
4764 South 900 East, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellee 
Oral Argument Requested 
'I'AHI.l'OHrONTMNTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.... 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN APPLYING BRICKEY'S 
PRESUMPTIVE BAR AGAINST REFILING TO THIS CASE... 
A. ihe due process concerns addressed by Brickey are not implicated 
where the original charges are not dismissed for lack of probable 
cause, but because the prosecutor was not ready to proceed. 
B. The record establishes no abusive practice where, upon refiling, the 
prosecutor expressed his willingness and ability to proceed 
without the missing witness. 
1. The State preser v - -^ • •• ; ;1-. •-
2. The refiling did not constitute an abusive practice as a matter of 
law, where the prosecutor stated he was ready to proceed with 
or without the witness 
3. The magistrate did not find, and the record does not suppoi i 
that the prosecutor either forum shopped or withheld evide^ 
4 The refiling did not violate due process merely because the 
state charges might have adversely affected separate, unrelated 
federal charges. 
CONCLUSION ., 
ADDENDA NECESSARY 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
State v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93,89 P.3d 191 passim 
State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87,34 P.3d 767 passim 
State v. Otterson, 2010 UT App 388, 672 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 7,8 
State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85,151 P.3d 171 17 
State v.Zahn, 2008 UT App 56,180 P.3d 186 3 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 16 
Utah Const, art. I 16 
STATE RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B 17 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7 16 
Utah R. Crim. P. 25 17 
ii 
Case No. 20090489-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
Luis Ceron, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Reply Brief 
The following points are submitted in response to arguments raised in 
Defendant Ceron's brief. For those matters not expressly addressed, the State relies 
on the arguments made in its opening brief. 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN APPLYING BRICKEY'S 
PRESUMPTIVE BAR AGAINST REFILING TO THIS CASE 
Ceron asserts that "[b]oth sides agree that Brickey and its progeny do not 
excuse a prosecutor from 'potential abusive practices that implicate due process or 
fundamental fairness '" Br. Aple. at 15. He then contends throughout his brief 
that the State's alleged bad faith and abusive practices in this case justified dismissal 
under Brickey. See Br. Aple. 15-31. Ceron, however, utterly fails to address the 
State's argument that, under this Court's decision in Atencio, Brickey does not even 
apply where, as here, the original charges were not dismissed for lack of probable 
cause, but only because the prosecutor was not ready to proceed. See State's Br. at 
19,25-29. 
Ceron's co-defendant Pacheco-Ortega, however, has addressed that issue. See 
Brief of Pacheco-Ortega at 36-45. In a footnote, Ceron purports to join in the 
arguments raised in his co-defendant Pacheco-Ortega's brief "to the extent that they 
are not inconsistent with his position." Br. Aple. 20 n.2. Given that the two cases 
have been consolidated for purposes of briefing and argument, the State does not 
challenge Ceron's ability to expand his response to the State in this manner. But 
where Ceron does not separately brief an issue, the State will repeat its responses to 
Pacheco-Ortega's arguments only as necessary to reply to Ceron's arguments. 
The crux of Ceron's arguments is that Brickey's presumptive bar against 
refiling applies whenever a prosecutor engages in any arguable abusive practice. 
He argues that Brickey's presumptive bar against refiling is an appropriate remedy 
here because the prosecutor engaged in bad faith and abusive practices by 
immediately refiling without first contacting Fleming, see Br. Aple. 15-18; by 
engaging in forum shopping, see id. at 19-27,29-31; and by withholding evidence, see 
id. As explained below, however, Brickey's presumptive bar against filing is not an 
appropriate remedy when the charges were dismissed because the prosecutor was 
not ready to proceed, as opposed to a lack of probable cause. 
2 
A. The due process concerns addressed by Brickey are not implicated 
where the original charges are not dismissed for lack of probable 
cause, but because the prosecutor was not ready to proceed. 
Ceron's arguments overlook that the "Brickey rule is a narrow one." State v. 
Zahn, 2008 UT App 56, \ 5,180 P.3d 186. By its terms-and as applied or interpreted 
in every subsequent Utah case—Brickey's holding limits a prosecutor's ability to 
ref ile only when the charges were earlier dismissed for a lack of probable cause after 
the prosecutor had presented his evidence at preliminary hearing. See State's Brf. 
21-29 and cases cited therein. As this Court recognized in Atencio, the line of 
Oklahoma cases—on which the Brickey rule was modeled—similarly limited its 
application to cases dismissed for insufficient evidence at preliminary hearing. State 
v. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^ 15-17,89 P.3d 191; see also State's Opening Brief at 25-
30 and Oklahoma cases cited therein (noting that Brickey's due process concerns 
apply only to evidentiary rulings). 
Like Pacheco-Ortega, Ceron cites no case or authority in which Brickey's 
narrow rule has been applied to any other circumstance. More importantly, both 
this Court and the Oklahoma courts have expressly held that, absent a potential 
abusive practice, Brickey's narrow rule does not apply to the circumstance presented 
here—the pre-evidentiary dismissal of charges for an inability to proceed. See 
Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, ^ 1547; State's Brf. at 25-28. 
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Ceron, like Pacheco-Ortega, also incorrectly assumes that the Brickey 
rule—fashioned to address the narrow abusive practice of repeated refilings after an 
adverse evidentiary ruling—is necessary to prevent an abusive practice that might 
arise when the prosecution has been dismissed because the prosecutor was not 
ready to proceed. The specific concern targeted by Brickey and its progeny was the 
harassment an accused would endure if the prosecution were allowed, without 
limitation, to repeatedly rehash what had already been decided by a magistrate after 
a preliminary hearing: that the prosecution was groundless or improvident because 
no probable cause supported it. See Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646-47; State v. Morgan, 2001 
UT 87, If 13, 34 P.3d 767. Indeed, Brickey's prosecutor unabashedly admitted to 
refiling in front of a different magistrate solely because he hoped to obtain a more 
favorable ruling. Id. at 646. He also vowed to continue refiling until he was 
successful: '"My theory of the prosecution is I disagreed with the [first judge], to be 
honest with you I have a chance to come back here every time and represent 
evidence until I get it bound over . . . . " ' Id. 
In Brickey, the "good faith of the prosecutor" was the only protection 
proffered for such a potentially abusive practice. Id. at 647. But given the obvious 
lack of good faith by Brickey's prosecutor, the supreme court concluded that due 
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process considerations imposed some limits on prosecutorial discretion to refile 
charges previously dismissed after preliminary hearing for insufficient evidence. Id. 
Balancing the right of the prosecution to refile charges against the right of a 
defendant to be free from repeated refiling of charges already determined to lack 
probable cause, the Brickey court fashioned a narrow rule to address a narrow 
problem: 
due process considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling criminal 
charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can 
show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that 
other good cause justifies refiling. 
Id. at 646 (emphasis added). See also Morgan, 2001 UT 87, | 11. To further curb 
potential abuse in this narrow circumstance, Brickey also required prosecutors 
"whenever possible, [to] refile charges before the same magistrate who does not 
consider the matter de novo, but looks to the facts to determine whether new 
evidence or changed circumstances are sufficient to require reexamination" of the 
previous adverse evidentiary ruling. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. See also Morgan, 2001 
UT 87, % 12. 
But as Atencio and the Oklahoma cases recognized, the due process concerns 
presented in Brickey are not implicated when—before evidence is presented and 
probable cause determined—the charges are dismissed because the prosecutor is not 
ready to proceed. See State's Brf. 21-29. In the latter case—as in this one—no 
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magistrate has determined that the prosecution is improvident for lack of probable 
cause. Thus, refiling in this case does not require an accused to repeatedly defend 
against charges already found to be groundless and improvident. Nor does it 
encourage forum shopping to obtain a more favorable probable cause ruling. Until 
an unfavorable bindover ruling has been issued, there can be no more favorable 
ruling and, therefore, no reason to forum shop. 
Moreover, applying Brickey's presumptive bar to refiling absent new or 
previously unavailable evidence makes no sense when the original charges were not 
dismissed for insufficient evidence. The question of whether there is "new or 
previously unavailable evidence" can arise only when there has been a previous 
preliminary hearing at which evidence has been presented. Otherwise, evidence 
can neither be new nor previously unavailable. 
In sum, as this Court recognized in Atencio, Brickey's presumptive bar against 
refiling does not apply, where, as here, the charges have been dismissed not for a 
lack of probable cause, but because the prosecutor was not ready to proceed. 
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B. The record establishes no abusive practice where, upon refiling, the 
prosecutor expressed his willingness and ability to proceed without 
the missing witness. 
Even assuming that Brickey theoretically applied to pre-evidentiary 
dismissals, dismissal was inappropriate here absent an abusive practice that 
implicated due process or fundamental fairness. See Morgan, 2001UT 87, f f 15-16. 
1. The State preserved its claim and marshaled the evidence. 
Ceron asserts that the State did not preserve its challenge to the magistrate's 
finding of bad faith and conclusion that the prosecutor engaged in an abusive 
practice. Br. Aple. 6-9. Ceron also asserts that the State has not marshaled the 
evidence. Id. 
The State, however, fully preserved its challenge to the magistrate's ruling in 
its oral argument opposing the defendants' motion to dismiss. See T09:ll:15-26. 
Among other things, the prosecutor argued his refiling without contacting Fleming 
was not in bad faith, because he reasonably believed that he could procure 
Fleming's future attendance and that he was ready and willing to proceed even if he 
could not. R09:ll:18-21. The prosecutor also argued that Atencio, rather than 
Brickey, applied to this case. R09:49:21-23. Because the State placed its issues 
squarely before the trial court, it preserved those issues for appeal. See State v. 
Otterson, 2010 UT App 388, f 7,672 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (to preserve issue for appeal, 
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it must be brought to trial court's attention so that the court had an opportunity to 
correct any error). 
Ceron, like Pacheco-Ortega, also argues that the State failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the magistrate's finding of bad faith and conclusion that the 
prosecutor engaged in abusive practices. Br. Aple. 8-9. Ceron, however, does not 
explain what evidence the State failed to acknowledge and address. See id. In any 
event, as shown below, the State acknowledged all relevant evidence that supported 
the magistrate's ruling and explained how it did not support either the magistrate's 
finding of bad faith or her conclusion of an abusive practice. 
The magistrate found that the prosecutor's "refiling as quickly as he did rose 
to the level of an abuse of practice and bad faith," because the prosecutor previously 
represented at the April 2nd setting that he "could not proceed" without Mr. 
Fleming, and immediately refiled without first directly contacting Mr. Fleming and 
ascertaining that he would cooperate in the prosecution. T09:ll:35-38. The State 
acknowledged the prosecutor's representation at the April 2nd hearing and his 
immediate refiling without contacting Fleming in its opening brief. See State's Brf. 
at 8-9, 11-12, 13-1, 32-33. The State also acknowledged that the magistrate 
apparently did not believe the prosecutor's subsequent representation that he was 
ready and able to proceed with or without Fleming. See State's Brf. at 32-33. The 
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State pointed out, however, that this finding appeared to have been based on the 
magistrate's mistaken recollection that she had specifically "questioned if the State 
was in a position to refile why they could not go forward with the preliminary 
hearing/' State's Brf. at 33 (quoting T09:ll:34). Because the transcript of the April 
2nd hearing establishes that the magistrate never questioned the prosecutor on that 
point, her finding of bad faith is necessarily clearly erroneous, at least to the extent it 
was based on her faulty recollection. See State's Br. 32-34. 
But even if the magistrate's finding of bad faith were not clearly erroneous, as 
explained in the State's opening brief and below, the prosecutor's conduct in this 
case did not, as a matter of law, rise to level of an abusive practice as defined by 
Brickey and its progeny. See State's Br. at 34. 
2. The refiling did not constitute an abusive practice as a matter of 
law, where the prosecutor stated he was ready to proceed with or 
without the witness. 
As explained, an abusive practice for due process purposes must implicate 
fundamental fairness by giving the prosecutor an unfair advantage. See Morgan, 
2001 UT 87, mf 15-16. Even assuming that refiling without first locating Fleming 
could be said to have been in bad faith, it worked no fundamental fairness against 
the defendants here. 
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As explained in the State's opening brief, immediate refiling in this case did 
not amount to an abusive practice, where the prosecutor expressed his willingness 
and ability to proceed, whether or not he secured Fleming's presence. First, this is 
not a case where the preliminary hearing was repeatedly continued based on the 
prosecutor's misconduct or lack of preparedness. Although Ceron now intimates 
otherwise, see Br. Aple. at 17-18,22-27, he, his co-defendant Pacheco-Ortega, and the 
magistrate acknowledged below that the first two continuances were not the fault of 
the prosecutor or due to any potentially abusive practices. T09:ll:30-32; T08:32:4-7; 
T08:25:4-5; T08:26:5-6. The record undisputedly shows that the prosecutor was 
prepared and ready to proceed with its witnesses, including Fleming, at the first two 
preliminary hearing settings. T08:32:3-6; T08:25:3-5. The record also undisputedly 
shows that Ceron, co-defendant Pacheco-Ortega, and the magistrate all agreed that 
the first two continuances were necessary to accommodate the victim/witness's 
constitutional rights. T08:32:3-6; T08:26:4-7. Indeed, Pacheco-Ortega's counsel first 
suggested Fleming's need for counsel and affirmatively conceded the need for the 
first two continuances to accommodate that right.1 T08:26:6-7, Thus, as the 
magistrate acknowledged, the first and only time that the prosecutor was not ready 
Pacheco-Ortega's counsel also conceded that having "brought that to [the 
prosecutor's] attention," he himself was "partially responsible for the need to get 
Mr. Fleming" appointed counsel. T08:26:6-7. 
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to proceed was at the April 2nd setting. T09:49:30-32. As stated, the magistrate did 
not fault the prosecutor for his inability to proceed at that hearing. 
Second, and most importantly, the prosecutor's immediate refiling before he 
located Fleming did not implicate due process or fundamental fairness as a matter 
of law, where upon refiling the prosecutor expressed his willingness and ability to 
proceed without Fleming. See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f f 15-16. Refiling without first 
locating Fleming would have, at most, merely inconvenienced the defendants by 
causing further delay if the prosecutor subsequently changed his mind and 
determined that he could not proceed without Fleming. Due process, however, '"is 
not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience/" such as requiring a 
defendant to repeatedly "return to court . . . on the same charges, thereby causing 
[him] unnecessary inconvenience and stress." Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, \ 18 
(quoting Morgan, 2001 UT 87, Tf 22). This is "because the 'nature of the criminal 
justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals who have been accused 
of those crimes/" Morgan, 2001 UT 87, \ 22 (citation omitted). 
But here the prosecutor insisted that he could and would proceed on the 
refiled charges with or without Fleming's presence. Until the prosecutor refused or 
failed to proceed due to Fleming's absence, neither defendant could complain that 
he was inconvenienced, much less that his due process rights were implicated. 
11 
Likewise, while the magistrate may have been skeptical that the prosecutor 
could establish probable cause without Fleming, the magistrate was not in a position 
to assess that claim until either (1) the evidence was presented, or (2) the prosecutor 
refused to proceed at the next preliminary hearing without Fleming. In effect, the 
magistrate's pre-evidentiary ruling denies the prosecutor from ever proving his 
case. Such a rule goes further than Brickey itself. 
3. The magistrate did not find, and the record does not support, that 
the prosecutor either forum shopped or withheld evidence. 
Ceron nevertheless asserts that the prosecutor here engaged in abusive 
practices by forum shopping and withholding evidence. See Br. Aple. 19-27. In the 
Brickey context, "[f]orum shopping occurs when 'a criminal prosecution [is] shuttled 
from one magistrate to another simply because a county attorney is not satisfied 
with the action of the magistrate in the precinct whose jurisdiction was first 
invoked.'" Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, | 17 n.5 (quoting Brickey, 714 R2d at 647) 
(second brackets in Atencio). 
As a threshold matter, the issue of forum shopping is irrelevant, where the 
Brickey motion was heard by the same magistrate who had previously dismissed the 
charges. As a secondary matter, as explained above, forum shopping does not have 
the same potential for abusive practices, where no magistrate ever assessed the 
evidence for sufficient probable cause. 
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And, as a final matter, the magistrate here did not find or base her ruling on 
forum shopping, even though the defendants nominally asserted the claim below. 
See R09:24 (in Pacheco-Ortega record); T09:ll:3-4. In fact, contrary to Ceron's 
assertions, nothing in the record could have supported such a finding. As in 
Atencio, the fact that a different judge is assigned to the case after refiling is not 
enough, standing alone, to establish forum shopping.2 Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, \ 
17. 
Filing an information without specifying a magistrate, as the prosecutor did 
here, simply left the assignment of a magistrate to random selection by the clerk's 
office. Allowing for random selection can hardly be called forum shopping for 
Brickey purposes. This is particularly true, where, as here, the prosecutor alerted 
both defense counsel before he refiled. T09:l:5-9. At that time, both counsel warned 
the prosecutor that they would be filing a Brickey motion to dismiss the refiled 
2
 Ceron cites Atencio for the proposition that to eliminate forum shopping, 
"the Utah Supreme Court held that 'when a charge is refiled, the prosecutor must, 
whenever possible, refile the charges before the same magistrate/7 Br. Aple. 21 
(quoting Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, % 17 n.5) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
That passage, however, is a direct quote from Brickey. Atencio, 2004 UT App 93, f 17 
n.5. Ceron ignores that Atencio held that Brickey does not apply when charges are 
dismissed because a prosecutor is not ready to proceed. See id. at ^ 12-17. Ceron 
also ignores that the Atencio court was unwilling to find forum shopping based 
solely on the fact that a different judge was assigned to the case after refiling. See id. 
at If 17. 
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information. T09:l:5-13. The prosecutor, therefore, knew that the refiled case would 
ultimately end up before the original magistrate. Indeed, when the defendants 
subsequently filed their Brickey motions, they asked that the matter be set in front of 
the original magistrate and the State did not object.3 See T09:57:3-4. 
Ceron's claim that the prosecutor deliberately withheld evidence is also not 
well-taken. Ceron asserts that the prosecutor knew from the 'Very first preliminary 
hearing setting/7 that "its key witness may not be able to testify," because he would 
"probably end up invoking the Fifth" Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Br. Aple. 23. Ceron asserts that the prosecutor should have 
anticipated this at the next two preliminary hearing settings and "taken steps to 
arrange for other State witnesses to testify at the next preliminary hearing rather 
than to withhold such evidence." Id. 
Significantly, the magistrate did not find, or base its ruling on a finding, that 
the prosecutor deliberately withheld evidence. And, as explained above and in the 
The State's opening brief states that the prosecution "agreed that the Brickey 
motion should be heard by the original magistrate." State's Br. 30. This was based 
on the minute entry of the roll call hearing, which stated: "Parties request Motion 
hearing before Judge Boyden." R09:17 (Pacheco-Ortega record). After the State 
filed its brief, Pacheco-Ortega requested a transcript of that hearing, which showed 
that the defense alone requested that the matter be set before Judge Boyden. See 
T09:57:3-4 (Pacheco-Ortega record). But whether or not the State joined in the 
defense request, it did not oppose it. See id. 
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State's opening brief, a prosecutor cannot withhold evidence for Brickey purposes 
unless there is a preliminary hearing at which evidence is presented. Moreover, as 
the prosecutor explained, he had no need of the other witnesses so long as he had 
Fleming present. T09:ll:20-21. Thus, there was no reason to subpoena them for the 
other hearings. Once the prosecutor realized that he might not be able to procure 
Fleming's presence, he was well within his discretion to reassess his case and 
determine that he could prove probable cause with other witnesses. It was error for 
the magistrate to second guess that assessment until she heard the prosecutor's 
evidence. 
Finally, contrary to Ceron's claims, there was no reason to suppose that 
Fleming could, or would, refuse to testify against the defendants based on his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. While Fleming could invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privilege as to any matter that might incriminate him, he could not 
invoke that privilege as to matters that would incriminate only the defendants. 
Thus, as the prosecutor correctly noted below, Fleming had no right to withhold 
evidence against the defendants. See T09:ll:30-31. 
In sum, the magistrate never found that the prosecutor forum shopped or 
withheld evidence. Nor did she base her ruling on such findings. The record would 
not have supported either finding in any event. 
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4. The refiling did not violate due process merely because the state 
charges might have adversely affected separate, unrelated federal 
charges. 
Ceron, who also faced unrelated federal charges, argues that the refiling 
implicated his due process rights because "the federal court declined to consider 
him for pretrial release due to the still pending nature of the State charges/' Br. 
Aple. 27. To the extent that Ceron, like Pacheco-Ortega, argues that the refiling was 
an abusive practice merely because it caused him to be detained a few weeks longer, 
it fails. 
As explained, Brickey's presumptive bar against refiling targets only 
prosecutorial abusive practices that implicate fundamental fairness by giving the 
prosecutor an unfair advantage over the defendant. See Morgan, 2001UT 87, ^|f 15-
16. The fact that both Ceron and Pacheco-Ortega were both held a few weeks longer 
after the refiling, however, is not the result of any prosecutorial abusive practice. 
This is because whether a defendant should continue to be held is in the hands of 
the court, not the prosecutor. See, e.g., Utah Const, art. I, § 8 (except as provided, all 
persons charged with a crime "shall be bailable"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (rights 
of accused include being "admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or 
be[ing] entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and 
if the business of the court permits"); Utah R. Crim. P. 7(b)-(c) (requiring magistrate 
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to determine bail within 48 hours). See also State v. Rogers, 2006 UT 85,1114-17,151 
P.3d 171 (refusing to extend Brickey to continuances because continuances within 
discretion of court, not prosecutor). Indeed, rule 25(d), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, provides that while further prosecution is not barred if a case is 
dismissed for unreasonable delay, "the court may make such orders with respect to 
the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the interest of 
justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and bail 
exonerated/7 Finally, a defendant being held without probable cause may seek 
release under rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which embodies the 
traditional writ of habeas corpus. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (governs all petitions 
claiming person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty). 
Thus, if a magistrate concludes that a defendant is being unfairly held because 
a prosecutor is repeatedly unprepared to proceed, she may release the defendant. 
Here, that remedy would have been more appropriate than a dismissal of these 
serious charges with prejudice. Indeed, a dismissal with prejudice when a 
prosecutor is not able to proceed imposes a far more draconian penalty than does 
Brickey's presumptive bar against refiling charges dismissed for insufficient 
evidence. Whereas Brickey permits refiling upon a showing of new or previously 
unavailable evidence or other good cause, the magistrate's dismissal with prejudice 
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here has forever barred refiling, whether or not the prosecution has new evidence or 
other good cause to proceed. 
* * * * * * 
In sum, as a matter of law, the refiling in this case did not amount to an 
abusive practice under Brickey, where the prosecutor expressed his willingness and 
ability to proceed, if necessary, without Fleming. Moreover, refiling the charges 
without having first found Fleming, gave the prosecutor no unfair advantage. As 
explained in the State's opening brief, if anything, the refiling placed the prosecutor 
in a more precarious position by potentially requiring him to proceed without the 
victim, should the State ultimately be unable to procure his presence. 
The magistrate, therefore, erred in relying on Brickey in dismissing the charges 
with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse and allow the prosecutor 
to proceed with whatever evidence he might have. 
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Respectfully submitted January 18,2011. 
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